Center News/Faculty and Staff Updates by Human Rights Brief
Human Rights Brief
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 12
2010
Center News/Faculty and Staff Updates
Human Rights Brief
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Legal Education Commons
This Column is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Human Rights Brief. "Center News/Faculty and Staff Updates." Human Rights Brief 17, no. 2 (2010) 72-74.
75
ALUMNI PROFILE
C
ou
rt
es
y 
of
 T
hi
er
no
 B
al
dé
.
Thierno Baldé.  
thierno Baldé recalls a peaceful childhood with his 
four brothers and three sisters in the small village of Fatako, 
Guinea. Born in 1973 to the village chief and his wife, as 
a young child, Baldé did not understand the struggles his 
country was facing. At that time, Ahmed Sékou Touré, the 
first Guinean president after the country gained independence 
from France in 1958, was in power. Under Sékou Touré’s 
revolutionary socialist regime, political protestors often faced 
torture, imprisonment, or execution. The government even 
sent Baldé’s uncle, a businessman, to jail three times at Camp 
Boiro, the infamous political prison and torture block that 
Touré created to silence opposition.
Baldé attended school in Fatako until age eleven, when he 
moved to the capital, Conakry, to live with his brother. After 
Touré’s death two years later, Baldé entered a French school. 
Soon thereafter, the Military Committee of National Recovery 
(CMRN) seized power, and its leader, Colonel Lansana Conté, 
became the president of Guinea. The CMRN abolished the 
Constitution and the National Assembly, and unilaterally led 
the country through ordinances, decrees, and decisions by the 
president and his ministers.
After Baldé visited Camp Boiro in 1984, he immediately 
knew he wanted to attend law school. “The scenes of the 
atrocities that I saw changed my life. I guess I lost my innocent 
childhood that day.” Baldé resolved to “do my best to make 
sure that those things don’t happen again . . . . [T]hat dream 
never left me.” By that point, more than 50,000 people had 
died at Camp Boiro since its opening in 1958; their “crimes” 
included staging student protests.
Baldé continued school in Conakry until he graduated 
from high school. After working for one year, he moved to 
Switzerland with only U.S. $300 to his name, and earned his 
J.D. from the University of Lausanne in 1999. He then earned 
an LL.M. in European Union Law and International Economic 
Law from the University of Geneva in 2000.
Then, Baldé moved to Washington, D.C. and began his 
studies at WCL, where he received an LL.M in International 
Business Law in 2001. Baldé says attending WCL was a 
“dream come true.” “My classmates were wonderful,” he 
states. “It was one of the most diverse groups in term[s] of 
background, nationalities, and experience. I learned a lot, not 
only from my classes but also from [the other students].” In 
addition, Baldé forged lasting friendships with many of his 
professors; he watched his first baseball game with Professor 
Michael Diamond and assisted Professor Jamin Raskin during 
his campaign for the Maryland State Senate.
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Baldé then worked with the World Bank Group for two 
years and returned to WCL to receive his third LL.M. in Law 
and Government in 2003. During this year, Baldé coached 
the René Cassin European Human Rights Moot Court team 
and traveled with three students to Strasbourg, France, to 
compete in the moot court competition based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Baldé had also been a member 
of the moot court team during law school in Lausanne, and 
he encourages all law students, particularly those interested 
in litigation, to participate in the “rewarding experience” of 
moot court.
In 2006, Baldé completed a J.S.M. in International Legal 
Studies with a focus on policy analysis at Stanford Law 
School, where he received the Stanford African Student 
Association Award and was a staff member on what is now the 
Stanford Journal of International Law.
Baldé then returned to Conakry and, in January 2007, 
founded the Research Institute on Democracy and Rule of 
Law (IRDED), an independent non-profit organization that 
promotes democratic principles, free society, and rule of 
law in West Africa. Among its projects, IRDED has orga-
nized seminars on the Legal Protection of the Media, pro-
vided legal counsel to NGOs regarding compliance with the 
Ministry of Interior’s licensing requirements, and encouraged 
young adults to participate in the electoral process and learn 
about nonviolent opposition methods. Baldé is currently the 
President of the Board of Directors of IRDED.
Baldé also “initiated several civic movements with youth 
leaders to ask President Conté to step down and establish 
a transitional council to organize free and fair elections.” 
However, President Conté died in December 2008, and a 
group of military officers called the National Council for 
Democracy and Development (CNDD) staged a coup only 
hours later. The self-proclaimed president, Captain Moussa 
Dadis Camara, suspended the constitution and promised to 
hold elections in 2009 to establish a civilian-led government, 
but those elections were never held. Baldé says, “It was 
unthinkable to imagine President Conté’s regime to perpetu-
ate after 24 years of struggle and misery . . . . I believed that 
for once we [would] change the destiny of our country for 
good.” Baldé and other activists spent many sleepless nights 
working to propose reforms for the new government. Of his 
discussions with President Camara, Baldé says, “He made me 
believe that he wanted to set up the path for the establishment 
of democracy and rule of law in Guinea. [A] few months later, 
I realized that the commitments made were worthless.”
Throughout the year, the CNDD suppressed political oppo-
sition and banned political and union activity. Baldé mounted 
a media campaign with private radio stations that denounced 
human rights violations and explained the necessity of free 
and fair elections. Baldé says most people were not willing to 
say these things on air “for fear of being arrested.” Finally, on 
September 28, 2009, a month after Camara promised a “fair” 
presidential election in January 2010, tens of thousands of 
people gathered at a Conakry stadium to peacefully protest 
the continued military rule and Camara’s apparent candidacy 
in the upcoming election. In response, government troops 
shot and killed at least 150 people, raped or sexually abused 
more than 100 women, and beat numerous other protestors. 
Baldé himself was arrested and jailed for helping to organize 
a hunger strike. Baldé and others are now focused on “lob-
bying for the International Criminal Court to investigate and 
judge the ones who are responsible [for] the killings.” As of 
mid-February, the ICC has begun a preliminary investiga-
tion regarding these “crimes against humanity.” Although 
President Camara’s government offered Baldé cabinet posi-
tions, he twice declined.
The international community has denounced the abuses 
by President Camara’s government and taken steps to isolate 
the government and push for accountability for the violence. 
In December 2009, one of Camara’s own guards attempted 
to assassinate him. Camara flew to Morocco for treatment, 
where he has remained in exile. On January 18, 2010, the 
military leaders, with the opposition’s assent, appointed civil-
ian Jean-Marie Doré as Prime Minister.
Baldé thinks Doré “has an opportunity to organize free 
and fair elections and leave a lasting legacy to Guinea . . . . 
I hope that he will avoid making the same mistakes as his 
predecessors: appointing his close friends and relatives to key 
positions and thinking that he will be able to have free hands.” 
Baldé strongly believes that “from now on, it will be difficult 
for any leader to forgo the will of the people and expect to 
remain in power. It’s a daily battle . . . but I have a good feel-
ing.” Guinea’s electoral commission has scheduled the civilian 
presidential election for June 27, 2010.
Baldé was recently appointed the Program Coordinator of 
the West Africa Public Interest Litigation Center (WAPILC), 
an organization based in Abuja, Nigeria that promotes human 
rights by improving the rule of law and access to justice for 
West African citizens. Baldé says this position will allow him 
“to advocate and lobby for respect of human rights principles 
and litigate [human rights] violations within [the Economic 
Community of West African States] member countries.”
Baldé is currently studying the legal protection of the 
media in Guinea for his S.J.D. dissertation from WCL under 
the supervision of Professor Jamin Raskin. He has already 
given his first presentation and hopes to return to WCL later 
this year to give his final presentation. Baldé remarks, “This 
year has been one of the most challenging I have had in a long 
time, but I guess these challenges are the forces that make us 
want to see the next year, hoping for better things.”       HRB
Courtney Moran, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College 
of Law, wrote the Alumni Profile for this issue of the Human 
Rights Brief.
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38 Mushinge, supra note 3.
39 Id.
40 “According to Albert Mando, General Secretary of the National 
Union of Mining and Allied Workers (NUMAW), workers at the 
NFC Africa copper mine, a Chinese-owned operation in Chambishi, 
north-eastern Zambia, were shot and wounded by both the police 
and Chinese management during a strike in July.” inteRnationaL 
tRaDe union confeDeRation, 2007 annuaL suRvey of vioLations 
of tRaDe union RigHts: ZamBia, available at http://survey07.ituc-
csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=ZMB&IDLang=EN [hereinafter 
annuaL suRvey 2007].
41 Kachingwe, supra note 37.
42 Chinese beaten up, supra note 33.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Chinese beaten up, supra note 33.
46 Id.
47 See previous section, “ZamBia’s Human RigHts oBLigations.”
48 Robyn Dixon, Africans Lash out at Chinese Employers, tHe Los 
angeLes times, Oct. 6, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.
com/2006/oct/06/world/fg-chizambia6 [hereinafter Dixon].
49 Id.; Guerin, supra note 7.
50 Bench Marks Foundation, Home Page, http://www.bench-marks.
org.za (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
51 fReek cRonJé, cHaRity cHenga & JoHann van wyk, coRPoRate 
sociaL ResPonsiBiLity in tHe ZamBian mining inDustRy (Bench 
Marks Foundation 2008), available at http://www.bench-marks.
org.za/research/gap3_part1.pdf [hereinafter coRPoRate sociaL 
ResPonsiBiLity].
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 coRPoRate sociaL ResPonsiBiLity, supra note 51.
55 Id.
56 SomaliPress.com, Controversial Chinese Firm Given Another 
Copper Mine in Zambia, http://www.somalipress.com/news/2009-
jun-02/controversial-chinese-firm-given-another-copper-mine-
zambia.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
57 Id.
58 Current President Lupiya Banda stated the following about NFC: 
“I want to assure you that this investor knows and understands the 
business of mining.” Id.
59 Dixon, supra note 48.
60 Mushinge, supra note 3.
61 Id.
62 Guerin, supra note 7.
63 Ching Kwan Lee, Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African 
Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese 
Enclaves (IRLE Working Papers, No. WP-2009-14, Feb. 2009), 
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2037d9f7 
[hereinafter Lee].
64 Id.
65 afRican DeveLoPment funD, seconD PoveRty ReDuction BuDget 
suPPoRt foR ZamBia: aPPRaisaL RePoRt (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-
and-Operations/ZM-2008-104-EN-ADF-BD-WP-ZAMBIA-AR-
SECOND-POVERTY-REDUCTION-BUGET-SUPPORT-PRBS-II.
PDF.
66 Elias Chipimo, Taxing the mining sector, IFLR 1000, http://www.
iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/150/Taxing-the-mining-sector.html 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
67 Id.
68 Danstan Kaunda, Sharing the Copper Windfall, inteR PRess 
seRvice news agency, Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://ipsnews.
net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=43604 [hereinafter Kaunda].
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Kaunda, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Shacinda, supra note 34.
75 Id.
76 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11.
77 annuaL suRvey 2007, supra note 40.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11; Lee, supra note 63.
81 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11.
88 cHRis PestRaukis, vuLneRaBiLity anD tHe emPLoyee: How to 
RestoRe Dignity to emPLoyment in ZamBia? (Jesuit Centre for 
Theological Reflection 2005), available at: http://www.jctr.org.zm/
downloads/4thQ-05-brief.pdf.
89 Id.
90 cHinese investments in afRica: a LaBouR PeRsPective, supra 
note 11.
91 UDHR, supra note 23.
92 African Charter, supra note 26.
93 Zambia acceded to the ICESCR and the ICCPR on April 10, 
1984 and ratified the African Charter on October 21, 1986. United 
Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 
2010). 
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9 For documents related to the sting operation, see Chevron Toxico, 
Chevron’s Corruption of Ecuador Trial, http://chevrontoxico.com/
news-and-multimedia/chevrons-corruption.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2010). A Chevron contractor and Ecuadorian citizen, Diego 
Borja, along with an American man passing himself off as the 
owner of an environmental remediation company, induced the then-
trial judge Juan Nuñez to meet with them to discuss the status of 
the trial. During this meeting, both men secretly videotaped the 
judge via micro-cameras in a pen and a watch to later claim the 
judge had already decided to rule against Chevron. The videos, 
however, do not support Chevron’s account and the judge is never 
seen on camera indicating he would rule one way or another. It 
turned out that Borja has worked for Chevron for several years 
on the Aguinda trial and was relocated to the United States and 
provided with a criminal lawyer paid for by Chevron, preventing 
him from being questioned. Borja also receives a salary from 
the company while he lives in the United States. The American 
involved in the scheme, Wayne Hansen, turned out to have lied 
about his credentials as the owner of a remediation company and 
had been convicted for his involvement in a conspiracy to import 
275,000 pounds of marijuana to the United States from Colombia. 
See id. for PDF of investigative report on the sting operation.
10 See Richard Cabrera, Responses the Plaintiffs Questions 
Concerning the Expert Report (Nov. 2008) (Updated Report), p.34 
Response to Question 42 (estimating the number of excessive can-
cer deaths attributable to contamination exposure at 1,401); see 
also Miguel San Sebastián et al., Outcomes of Pregnancy among 
Women Living in the Proximity of Oil Fields in the Amazon Basin 
of Ecuador, 8 No. 4 int’L J. of occuPationaL & envtL. HeaLtH 
312 (2002) (finding pregnancies of women in communities rely-
ing on streams with high TPH concentrations significantly more 
likely to end in spontaneous abortion); Miguel San Sebastián et al., 
Exposures and Cancer Incidence Near Oil Fields in the Amazon 
Basin of Ecuador, 58 No. 8 occuPationaL & envtL. meD. 517 
(2001) (revealing severe exposure to TPHs by the residents of the 
community of San Carlos and significantly higher than expected 
rates of cancer and cancer deaths, even when controlling for 
employment in the oil industry and smoking habits); Miguel San 
Sebastián et al., La salud de mujeres que viven cerca de pozos 
y estaciones de petróleo en la Amazonía ecuatoriana, 9 No. 6 
Revista PanameRicana De saLuD PuBLica 375 (2001) (demonstrat-
ing significantly higher prevalence of skin fungi, nasal irritation, 
and throat irritation, and associations with higher prevalence of 
fatigue, headaches, eye irritation, earaches, diarrhea, and gastri-
tis in women living in communities relying on streams with high 
TPH concentrations); Anna-Karen Hurtig & Miguel San Sebastián, 
Incidence of Childhood Leukemia and Oil Exploitation in the 
Amazon Basin of Ecuador, 10 No. 3 int’L J. of occuPationaL & 
envtL. HeaLtH 245 (2004) (finding significantly higher rates of 
child leukemia in Oriente counties where oil exploitation had been 
ongoing for at least twenty years as compared with non-oil-produc-
ing counties).
11 The President of the Court in Nueva Loja appointed a Court 
Expert to evaluate the environmental damage suffered, if any, to 
the soil, water, vegetation, fauna in the surrounding area to specify, 
if possible, the origin of such damage; verify the existence of sub-
stances affecting the environment; specify the technical work and 
measures which must be implemented to restore the environmental 
damage, as far as technically possible; and determine methods for 
restoration based on the characteristics of each environment.
12 See RicHaRD caBReRa staLin vega, tecHnicaL summaRy RePoRt, 
exPeRt oPinion 19 (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://chevron-
toxico.com/assets/docs/cabrera-english-2008.pdf.
13 “Produced water” is toxic water, high in sodium chloride which 
comes out of the ground mixed with the crude oil. Because the 
water has been in contact with hydrocarbon-bearing formations, it 
contains some of the chemical characteristics of the formations and 
the hydrocarbons as well as chemicals added during the produc-
tion processes. coRRie cLaRk & JoHn a. veiL, aRgonne nation 
LaB., PRoDuceD wateR voLumes anD management PRactices in tHe 
uniteD states (2009) (prepared for U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Fossil Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory). 
“Produced water” can be extremely harmful to animal and plant life 
with which it comes into contact. Chevron’s operation in Ecuador 
was no exception. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has a standard of 230 ppm chloride (which mea-
sures saltiness) for the protection of freshwater aquatic life. u.s. 
ePa. office of wateR ReguLations anD stanDaRDs, cRiteRia 
anD stanDaRDs Division amBient wateR QuaLity cRiteRia foR 
cHLoRiDe–1988 (February 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/criteria/library/ambientwqc/chloride1988.pdf. In an 
environmental audit conducted for Texaco as it was winding down 
its operation in Ecuador, chloride concentrations measured in every 
sample taken from the production water discharged at all eigh-
teen Texaco production stations exceed the EPA standard, several 
by an order of magnitude. Most of the samples taken exceeded 
10,000 ppm chloride, and the maximum was 104,000 ppm chloride 
(seawater has approximately 19,000 ppm chloride). HBt agRa 
LimiteD, enviRonmentaL assessment of tHe PetRoecuaDoR-texaco 
consoRtium oiL fieLDs: voLume i – enviRonmentaL auDit RePoRt 
(1993). These extremely high salt concentrations were toxic to 
the organisms in the freshwater streams and rivers downstream 
of Texaco’s discharge points. See vega, supra note 12, at Annex 
J. They also, obviously, were harmful to the local inhabitants who 
had relied for millennia on those fresh water sources for their suste-
nance.
14 HBt agRa LimiteD, enviRonmentaL assessment of tHe 
PetRoecuaDoR-texaco consoRtium oiL fieLDs: voLume i – 
enviRonmentaL auDit RePoRt, 5-10 (1993) (revealing, “No test-
ing is conducted on the wastewater prior to disposal into the 
river . . .”) (draft on file with the author); fugRo-mccLeLLanD 
west, enviRonmentaL fieLD auDit foR PRactices 1964-1990, 
PetRoecuaDoR-texaco consoRtium, oRiente, ecuaDoR, E-2, 
Executive Summary (1992) (stating, “All produced water from  
the production facilities eventually discharged to creeks and  
streams . . . . None of the discharges were registered with the 
Ecuadorian Institute of Sanitary Works (IEOS) as required by 
the Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Environmental 
Pollution related to Water Resources (1989)”) (on file with author).
15 The release by its plain language and legislative history never 
intended to cover claims by third parties of the type being pressed 
in Aguinda. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the 
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parties provided that “[t]he provisions of this [MOU] shall apply 
without prejudice to the rights possibly held by third parties for the 
impact caused as a consequence of the operations of the former 
Petroecuador-Texaco consortium.” Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of Ecuador, Petroecuador, and Texaco 
Petroleum Company (Dec. 14, 1994) (on file with author). A 1995 
settlement agreement that followed the MOU by its terms released 
only those claims belonging to Ecuador and Petroecuador. The 1995 
Settlement Agreement states in pertinent part: “On the execution 
date of this contract . . . the Government and Petroecuador shall 
hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge Texpet . . . Texaco, 
Inc. . . . of all the Government’s and Petroecuador’s claims against 
the Releases for Environmental Impact arising from the Operations 
of the Consortium, except for those related to the obligations 
conducted hereunder for the performance by Texpet of the Scope 
of Work.” Contract for Implementing of Environmental Remedial 
Work and Release from Obligations, Liability and Claims (May 4, 
1995) (on file with author).
16 vega, supra note 12, at 26 (finding that “the level of petroleum 
contamination in pits that were cleaned up by Texpet appears to be 
no lower than the contamination in pits that Texpet did not clean 
up”).
17 See Doug Beltman & Ann Maest, Texaco’s Misuse of the TCLP 
Test in Ecuador (Feb. 2009), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/
assets/docs/tclp-misuse.pdf; see also Amazon Defense Coalition, 
New Evidence Shows Chevron Manipulated Lab Results in 
Landmark Environmental Trial (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://
chevrontoxico.com/news-and-multimedia/2009/0204-new-evidence-
shows-chevron-manipulated-lab-results.html?searched=TCLP&a
dvsearch=allwords&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_
highlight1.
18 Jorge Roberto Salcedo Gonzalez, Inspección Judicial del Pozo 
Shushufindi 38, Prepared for Chevron Re: Maria Aguinda y Otros 
vx. ChevronTexaco Coporation, Corte Superior de Justicia, Nuevo 
Loja, Ecuador, Jucio No. 002-2003 (Mar. 16, 2006).
19 Press Release, Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, Members of 
Congress Urge USTR to Ignore Chevron Petition on Ecuador Legal 
Case (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.lindasanchez.house.
gov/news.cfm/article/595 (stating, “Rather than allowing this case 
to come to a conclusion, embarking on clean-up efforts, or even 
seeking mediation, Chevron has engaged in a lobbying effort that 
looks like little more than extortion . . . . Apparently, if it can’t get 
the outcome it wants from the Ecuadorian court system, Chevron 
will use the U.S. government to deny trade benefits until Ecuador 
‘cries uncle.’”).
20 See supra note 6.
21 Id.
22 See Carl Pope, Pity the Poor Oil Company, sieRRa cLuB, Apr. 
25, 2008, http://sierraclub.typepad.com/carlpope/2008/04/pity-the-
poor-o.html.
23 See Fund For Peace, Health and Business Roundtable Indonesia, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_conten
t&task=view&id=320&Itemid=483 [(last visited Feb. 16, 2010)] 
(noting, “Chevron…[was] the first member to provide financial 
support to sustain HBRI by sponsoring the sixth Roundtable session 
and third workshop) .
24 For copy of military report, see Military Report on Cancellation 
of Guanata Inspection, available at http://chevrontoxico.com/news-
and-multimedia/2005/1020-military-report-on-cancellation-of-
guanta-inspection.html?searched=guanta&advsearch=allwords&hig
hlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1.
25 Petitioner’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Republic 
of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. No. 09 
Civ. 9958 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 10, 2010) (citing Letter from M. 
Kolis (Aug. 11, 2005), which stated, “Texaco and now Chevron’s 
representatives have met regularly with representatives of the 
Republic to discuss various matters between the company and  
the Republic. As new administrations have come to power in 
Ecuador . . . Texaco and Chevron representatives have always  
made efforts to meet with government officials, including the 
President, if possible . . . to discuss the state of affairs between  
the company and the Republic.”).
26 For a letter from the International Commission of Jurists and 
Amnesty International, see Press Release, International Commission 
of Jurists (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.texacotoxico.org/
eng/node/41.
27 Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 
452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
28 Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.. 296 F. App’x 124, 
2008 WL 4507422 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2862 (2009).
29 In an Arbitration under the Treaty Between the U.S. and 
the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, (UNCITRAL PCA Case No. AA277).
30 Issued by the First Civil Court of Pichincha, Case No. 2003-0983 
(Feb. 26, 2007).
31 See Douglas Beltman, Equitable Justice: A Comparison of 
Environmental Disasters and Cleanup Costs, Stratus Consulting 
(May 20, 2008) (finding the actual damages in the Cabrera report is 
consistent with damages assessments for other large environmental 
disasters) (noting Hanford nuclear waste facility, United States, U.S. 
$53 to $63 billion; Prestige oil spill, Spain, U.S. $4.2 billion; and 
Rocky Flats, United States, U.S. $7.2 billion) (on file with author).
32 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in 
U.S., waLL st. J., July 20, 2009, at B3.
33 Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Calls for Dismissal of Ecuador 
Lawsuit (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/
press/Release/?id=2007-10-08.
34 Michael Isikoff, A $16 Billion Problem, newsweek, Jul. 26, 2008, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/149090.
35 Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. & Texaco 
Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/
EcuadorBITEn.pdf.
36 Though Chevron argues it is not liable in the Aguinda trial 
because of a prior U.S. $40 million remediation agreement with the 
Ecuadorian government, the S.D.N.Y. was extensively briefed on 
the issue in prior and pending arbitration cases between Republic of 
Ecuador and Chevron and has indicated it is “highly unlikely” the 
release applied to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Republic of Ecuador v. 
Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co., No. 09 Civ. 9958, FN 20 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 10, 2010) (explaining (1) the “release” on its 
face was limited to claims by the Republic and PetroEcuador; (2) 
the parties had expressly agreed in Article VIII of a 1994 MOU that 
the Republic’s and PetroEcuador’s release of TexPet would “apply 
without prejudice to the rights possibly held by third parties for the 
impact caused as a consequence of the operations of the former 
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PETROECUADOR-ECUADOR Consortium;” (3) TexPet’s principal 
Ecuadorian legal advisor at the time the MOU and Settlement 
Agreement were executed testified that Article VIII of the MOU 
“carves out entirely” from the release “any action brought by parties 
who were not parties to the settlement agreement”; (4) in any 
event, and as a matter of Ecuadorian law, the Republic could not 
waive the rights of third parties; and (5) even though the Aguinda 
case in which the plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form of 
remediation of the “contamination and spoliation of [plaintiffs’] 
properties, water supplies and environment” had been pending for 
two years by the time the 1995 Settlement Agreement was signed, 
the Agreement and its release made no reference to the pending 
Aguinda case whatsoever and included neither an indemnification 
nor a save harmless clause with respect to third-party claims. As 
S.D.N.Y. observed in its 2005 decision in Republic of Ecuador v. 
ChevronTexaco Corp., “Absent this contention by Defendants [that 
the claims brought in Lago Agrio were different than the claims 
in Aguinda], it would be extremely difficult for Defendants to 
establish that claims nominally brought by third parties in the Lago 
Agrio litigation were covered by the 1995 and 1998 Agreements 
between Texaco and Ecuador: it is highly unlikely that a settlement 
entered into while Aguinda was pending would have neglected to 
mention the third-party claims being contemporaneously made 
in Aguinda if it had been intended to release those claims or to 
create an obligation to indemnify against them.” (citing Republic 
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